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Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit 
Crucible 
Jonathan R. Siegel† 
We do not really know whether judicial reliance on legisla-
tive history or other interpretive techniques that go beyond 
simply enforcing plain text is helpful, but we do know that 
these techniques are expensive. Therefore, courts should reject 
them. 
That, in a nutshell, is Adrian Vermeule’s challenge to the 
community of interpretation scholars. His new book, Judging 
Under Uncertainty,1 eschews, and attempts to transcend, the 
main elements of the long-standing debates over methods that 
courts should use to interpret statutes and the Constitution. 
Countless judges and scholars have attempted to prove that 
particular interpretive methods are constitutionally required or 
constitutionally illegitimate;2 Vermeule rejects these  
 
 † Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. A.B. 
Harvard University; J.D. Yale Law School. The production of this Article was 
supported by a grant from the George Washington University Law School, 
which I acknowledge with gratitude. I would like to thank my colleague Mi-
chael Abramowicz for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
Copyright © 2007 by Jonathan R. Siegel. 
 1. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). For reviews, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041 (2006) 
(book review); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (2007) (book review). 
 2. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.”); 
ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 35 (Amy Gut-
mann ed., 1997) (arguing that reliance on legislative history is unconstitution-
al); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
990, 991–98 (2001) (arguing that the Constitution permits nontextualist in-
terpretive practices); John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1649–51 (2001) (arguing 
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efforts.3 Similarly, he sees no need to resolve apparently burn-
ing questions such as whether courts are bound by what legis-
latures write, or by what legislatures intend4—again distancing 
himself from innumerable arguments in the scholarly litera-
ture.5 For Vermeule, everything comes down to a simple but wi-
thering cost-benefit analysis involving two factors: the empiri-
cal uncertainty regarding the benefits of interpretive methods 
that do more than simply enforce plain text, and the costs of 
those methods.6 Because we lack, and probably cannot hope to 
get, data that could tell us whether these methods move courts 
 
that our constitutional structure compels courts to adopt the “faithful agent” 
model of statutory interpretation and to reject the English practice of equita-
ble interpretation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 706–07 (1997) (arguing that the constitutional rule 
against congressional self-aggrandizement prohibits reliance on legislative 
history in statutory interpretation); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative 
History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1460–61 
(2000) [hereinafter Siegel, Use of Legislative History] (arguing that the Consti-
tution permits courts to consult legislative history, but imposes some limits on 
what may constitute consultable legislative history). 
 3. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 31 (“[C]onstitutional premises . . . 
mandate neither formalist interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive 
methods . . . . The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal 
about the contested issues of statutory interpretation . . . .”). 
 4. See id. at 87 (arguing that it might be possible to “bracket” this and 
other high-level questions altogether, if institutional considerations show that 
judges should, in practice, use the same interpretive techniques under any 
theory of the ultimate goals of interpretation). 
 5. Compare, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 2, at 16–18 (“[D]espite frequent 
statements to the contrary, [courts] do not really look for subjective legislative 
intent.”), and Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67–68 (1994) (“[S]tatutory text 
and structure, as opposed to legislative history and intent (actual or imputed), 
supply the proper foundation for meaning. . . . Intent is empty. . . . Intent is 
elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”), and Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992) (“Legislative intent is an internally in-
consistent, self-contradictory expression.”), with WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 
COMMENTARIES 59 (photo. reprint 1979) (1765) (“The fairest and most rational 
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at 
the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”), 
and Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in 
Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 
39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281, 301 (1990) (“[W]hen we are called upon to interp-
ret statutes, it is our primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, to 
subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because the legislators’ collec-
tive intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court. . . . Congress 
makes the laws, I try to enforce them as Congress meant them to be en-
forced.”). 
 6. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 153–229. 
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closer to or further away from any accepted interpretive goal, 
and because we do know that the methods are costly, Vermeule 
believes courts should reject them.7 
The goal of this Article is to engage Professor Vermeule’s 
arguments and to respond to the substantial challenge that his 
book presents to the interpretation scholarship community. In 
essence, Vermeule challenges interpretation scholars to justify 
their allegedly sophisticated interpretive recommendations. For 
decades (indeed, centuries), interpretive theorists have debated 
the goals of statutory interpretation and have offered innumer-
able prescriptions for how courts might best achieve those 
goals.8 But, Vermeule argues, scholars have neglected critical 
elements of the inquiry by naively assuming that judges might 
adopt their pet interpretive theories en masse and execute 
them perfectly.9 Vermeule claims that prominent interpretive 
theorists have neglected to consider the inevitable, institutional 
limitations on judicial interpretation—limits that stem from 
judges’ cognitive limitations, from the limits on their time and 
resources, and from each judge’s inability to compel other 
judges to adopt preferred interpretive methods.10 No interpre-
tive theory, Vermeule concludes, can be correct unless it incor-
porates the institutional limitations that may cause courts to 
err.11 Vermeule’s theory of interpretation focuses almost exclu-
sively on these limitations. 
The result is perhaps the most austere vision of the judicial 
interpretive role ever put forward. Vermeule argues that, in 
cases where the statutory text at issue is unambiguous and 
specifically addresses the question before the court, the court 
should enforce the statute’s text and eschew all other consider-
ations, such as legislative history, interpretation of the statuto-
ry text in light of similar text in other statutes, and canons of 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. Blackstone’s assertion of the judicial power to depart from statutory 
text that dictates an absurd result goes back to 1765. See BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 5, at 60. Blackstone relies on the work of Pufendorf, published a century 
earlier. See id.; 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI 
OCTO 802 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934) 
(1688) (“[W]hen words, if taken in their plain and simple meaning, will pro-
duce an absurd or even no effect, some exception must be made from their 
more generally accepted sense, that they may not lead to nothingness or ab-
surdity.”). 
 9. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 36. 
 10. Id. at 15–39. 
 11. See id. at 15–18, 36–39. 
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construction.12 In cases where the statutory text contains an 
ambiguity, courts should defer to administrative or other ex-
ecutive branch constructions of the statute without attempting 
to use traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve the 
ambiguity.13 
As with statutes, so too with the Constitution. The courts, 
Vermeule argues, should enforce clear and specific constitu-
tional texts, but should disclaim any role beyond that.14 Where 
constitutional texts are ambiguous or open ended, courts 
should let legislatures interpret them.15 Under this rule, 
Vermeule blandly notes, courts would cease enforcing the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.16 In particular, 
freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection would all 
be remitted to legislative enforcement.17 
A bit of a comedown for judges! Vermeule recognizes that 
his proposed interpretive methods would make judges rather 
humble functionaries18 and pluck the heart out of the academic 
enterprise of advising judges regarding statutory interpreta-
tion.19 But, Vermeule notes, the goal is not to make judges’ 
work interesting,20 nor for academics to have fun,21 but to find 
interpretive methods that work best for our institutional struc-
ture given the empirical uncertainties surrounding the value of 
various interpretive methods.22 Vermeule’s book challenges in-
terpretation scholars to ask whether they really have any basis 
for believing that their favorite methods make interpretation 
better rather than worse. 
This Article attempts to respond to Professor Vermeule’s 
important challenge. After Part I summarizes Vermeule’s ar-
guments, Part II examines both ends of Vermeule’s cost-benefit 
critique. First, Part II.A addresses the “cost” side of Vermeule’s 
equation—the claim that discarding all judicial interpretive 
methods beyond enforcement of plain text will result in an 
 
 12. Id. at 189, 198, 202–03. 
 13. Id. at 206. 
 14. Id. at 230. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 230–31. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 229. 
 19. Id. at 290. 
 20. Id. at 229. 
 21. Id. at 290. 
 22. Id. at 229, 290. 
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“enormous” cost savings.23 Part II.A questions whether the 
costs of judicial interpretation are really as “enormous” as 
Vermeule asserts.24 It also suggests that regardless of the size 
of the costs of interpretive methods, implementing Vermeule’s 
theory might not eliminate those costs. Adoption of Vermeule’s 
theory by only some judges would leave the bulk of the costs in 
place,25 and the avoidance of judicial interpretive costs could 
result in increased offsetting costs elsewhere in the legal sys-
tem.26 
The remainder of Part II considers the “benefit” side of the 
analysis—Vermeule’s claim that there is no way to gauge 
whether the interpretive techniques that he rejects have any 
positive net benefits.27 This Part suggests that while no one can 
precisely measure the value of these techniques, there are rea-
sons to believe that the value is positive. It analyzes different 
interpretive contexts that Vermeule discusses and suggests 
that the judiciary has important institutional advantages that 
apply to each. The judiciary’s institutional features, this Part 
suggests, give it a comparative advantage over other institu-
tional bodies in detecting appropriate occasions for departure 
from statutory text,28 in checking the self-aggrandizing tenden-
cies of the executive branch,29 and in enforcing constitutional 
constraints on the legislative power.30 These institutional ad-
vantages suggest that judicial interpretive techniques that go 
beyond enforcement of plain text produce value, thus under-
mining Vermeule’s argument that because such techniques of-
fer zero benefits, we should discard them to avoid their costs. 
I.  VERMEULE’S CHALLENGE   
Before critiquing Professor Vermeule’s theory, it seems on-
ly fair to present it in its best light. In compressing three hun-
dred pages into ten, some nuances will undoubtedly be lost. 
Professor Vermeule’s main ideas, however, are sufficiently sim-
ple that they can be summarized briefly. 
 
 23. E.g., id. at 194. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 25. See infra Part II.A.2.a. 
 26. See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 27. E.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 193. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
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A. VERMEULE’S CRITIQUE 
Vermeule begins by criticizing prior interpretation scholar-
ship for failing to analyze the institutions that carry out the in-
terpretive process.31 Ignoring this institutional structure, 
Vermeule says, is a fundamental error.32 No interpretive theory 
can succeed without considering both the capabilities of inter-
preters to carry it out and the social effects of giving particular 
institutions interpretive powers.33 
A good picture of Vermeule’s critique emerges from his crit-
icism34 of Blackstone’s acceptance of the principle that courts 
should construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results.35 Even if 
everyone could agree that “absurd results are bad,” it might not 
follow, Vermeule suggests, that courts should have the power to 
construe statutes to avoid absurd results.36 He bases his argu-
ment not on the conventional, formalist reason that judicial 
reform of statutes constitutes an invasion of the legislative 
power,37 but on practical reasons stemming from the institu-
tional capability and fallibility of courts.38 
If courts have the power to avoid statutory absurdity, 
Vermeule notes, it is inevitable that they will sometimes use 
that power incorrectly: they will sometimes mistakenly con-
clude that a statutory application is absurd because the judges 
cannot sufficiently appreciate the relevant policies or purposes 
behind the statute.39 The costs of mistaken exercises of the ab-
surdity power must be set against the benefits of its correct 
use.40 Moreover, judges will have to decide whether any given 
application of a statute produces an absurd result, and making 
this determination will require courts to expend interpretive 
resources, which is another cost that must be considered.41 Fi-
 
 31. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 19. 
 35. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 60 (providing the famous ex-
ample that a law against “letting blood in the streets” should not apply to a 
doctor who bleeds a patient who has fallen down in the street in a fit). 
 36. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
 37. Id. at 31. 
 38. See id. at 20–21, 61 (noting that interpretive rules “must be chosen in 
light of institutional capacities and the systemic effects of interpretive ap-
proaches”). 
 39. Id. at 20, 38–39. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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nally, giving courts the power to reform statutes introduces un-
certainty that also creates costs; parties planning their conduct 
must consider the possibility that a court will later disregard 
statutory text because it produces a result the court considers 
to be absurd.42 
The costs of error, of the decision process, and of legal un-
certainty are for Vermeule vital institutional considerations 
that most interpretation scholarship ignores.43 Vermeule criti-
cizes the main players in the interpretation world for assuming 
that judges will perfectly carry out interpretive methods.44 For 
example, the purposivism of Hart and Sacks requires judges to 
promote legal coherence,45 a fine aspiration. However, Verme-
ule observes, the theory could go awry if judges wrongly identi-
fy the principles and purposes to which the law is then made to 
cohere.46 Similarly, William Eskridge’s theory of “dynamic” sta-
tutory interpretation47 may successfully refute the formalist, 
separation-of-powers objections to judicial “updating” of sta-
tutes,48 but it insufficiently considers whether the same objec-
tions might be justified on different, institutional grounds. Es-
kridge does not, Vermeule says, adequately consider whether 
dynamism might cause more harm than good, because cases in 
which fallible judges mistakenly update statutes (because they 
fail to perceive the statutes’ current social utility) might out-
number the cases in which courts update statutes correctly.49 
Vermeule similarly addresses Judge Richard Posner’s early 
theory of “imaginative reconstruction,”50 which called upon 
judges to ask what an enacting legislature would have done if 
presented with a given case.51 Vermeule criticizes Posner for 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 36 (“[I]ntellects of the highest caliber have explored inter-
pretive strategies without attending to the fact that such strategies will in-
evitably be used by fallible institutions.”). 
 45. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111–1380 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (analyzing the role of the 
courts in interpreting statutes). 
 46. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 47. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994). 
 48. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 45. 
 49. Id. at 47. 
 50. Id. at 52–53. 
 51. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpre- 
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failing to consider that imaginative reconstruction, if performed 
poorly, might drive courts farther away from legislative intent 
than would unimaginative, plodding application of statutory 
text.52 Posner’s more recent pragmatic theory, which views 
judges as “wise elders” and licenses them to interpret statutes 
so as to maximize their beneficial social consequences,53 simi-
larly fails, in Vermeule’s view, to consider whether the costs of 
decision and the costs of legal uncertainty associated with 
pragmatism would outweigh its benefits.54 
Vermeule even criticizes John Manning, a formalist whose 
ultimate interpretive prescriptions have considerable overlap 
with Vermeule’s, for reaching his conclusions on the basis of 
constitutional, separation-of-powers arguments, rather than on 
the basis of institutional characteristics.55 For Vermeule, con-
stitutional arguments are unsatisfactory guides to interpretive 
practices—the Constitution, he says, mandates neither formal-
ist nor nonformalist interpretive methods.56 The focus, accord-
ing to Vermeule, should be on the institutional characteristics 
of the interpreter.57 Through his review and criticism of the 
prominent interpretation theories, Vermeule takes the inter-
pretation scholarship community to task for disregarding insti-
tutional considerations in developing interpretive theories. 
B. VERMEULE’S RECONSTRUCTION 
Interpretation scholarship, Vermeule therefore says, must 
take an “institutional turn”—it must consider the institutional 
characteristics of the interpretive actors in our legal system.58 
For Vermeule, several of these characteristics are especially sa-
lient: judicial capacities and potential for error, the costs and 
systemic effects of interpretive methods, and the difficulties of 
methodological coordination within the judiciary.59 
 
tation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 190 
(1987). 
 52. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 52–53. 
 53. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Ri-
chard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: 
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235, 244 (Morris Dick-
stein ed., 1998). 
 54. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 54. 
 55. Id. at 29–33. 
 56. Id. at 31–32. 
 57. See id. at 36–39. 
 58. Id. at 63. 
 59. Id. at 86–148. 
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Vermeule begins by considering judicial capacities.60 He 
argues that debates over proper interpretive methods have fo-
cused too much on theoretical considerations and have too often 
ignored the question of judicial capacity to perform interpretive 
methods properly.61 Vermeule illustrates this point by consider-
ing the question of judicial reliance on legislative history.62 He 
argues that while formalists and intentionalists have long de-
bated whether or not reliance on legislative history is constitu-
tionally permissible, they have ignored the most vital consider-
ation: whether courts really benefit from, or will merely be 
confused by, legislative history.63 
To show this, Vermeule presents a detailed critique of the 
famous case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.64 He 
argues that the Supreme Court, in attempting to use legislative 
history to implement congressional intent in that case, misread 
the legislative history.65 This case study, Vermeule claims, re-
veals the importance of considering the possibility of judicial 
error.66 It demonstrates that even given a series of generous as-
sumptions—that Congress forms a collective intent about the 
meaning of statutory text, that legislative history properly re-
flects that intent, and that intent is the ultimate touchstone of 
statutory meaning—courts should still reject legislative history 
because of the problem of judicial capacity.67 Courts, Vermeule 
notes, have limited resources and may not be able to properly 
process all of a statute’s legislative history, especially given 
how voluminous and heterogeneous legislative history can be.68 
According to Vermeule, Holy Trinity shows that judicial re-
liance on legislative history may move courts further from, ra-
ther than closer to, the proper interpretation of a statute, even 
assuming that legislative history would provide an infallible in-
terpreter with the best guide to statutory meaning.69 If this is 
true, perhaps even intentionalists should reject legislative his-
tory as an interpretive tool, not because of any theoretical prob-
lem with it, but because of the practical problem that it may 
 
 60. Id. at 86–117. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 65. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 90–102. 
 66. Id. at 102–03. 
 67. Id. at 106–07. 
 68. Id. at 110–17. 
 69. Id. at 105–17. 
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drive courts further away from what intentionalists themselves 
claim is the goal of interpretation—ascertaining legislative in-
tent.70 
Based on this example, Vermeule concludes that the gener-
alizable lesson is that many of the apparently great debates in 
interpretive theory may be irrelevant.71 If practical considera-
tions dictate that the actual interpretive methods that courts 
should use would be the same under both textualist and inten-
tionalist theories, little justification remains for debating which 
theory provides the ultimate guide to statutory meaning.72 If 
even an intentionalist would conclude on the basis of intentio-
nalist theory that, in light of the possibility of judicial error, 
courts should not consult legislative history, textualists and in-
tentionalists could reach practical agreement without resolving 
their larger, theoretical debate.73 
The other main institutional consideration that Vermeule 
addresses is the lack of coordination within the judiciary.74 In-
terpretation scholars, Vermeule notes, often offer prescriptions 
for “the courts” to adopt, as though the entire judiciary were 
governed by some Kantian universal imperative and might, en 
masse, adopt a particular interpretive method.75 In reality, 
however, no judge can force any other judge to adopt particular 
interpretive methods. Indeed, perhaps somewhat curiously, 
even when the Supreme Court makes a ruling related to statu-
tory interpretation, it appears to give the ruling stare decisis 
effect only as to the particular interpretation reached; neither 
the Court nor individual justices seem to regard rulings as hav-
ing stare decisis effect with regard to interpretive methodolo-
gy.76 Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, continues his notable 
campaign against reliance on legislative history even though 
the Supreme Court has expressly rejected his position.77 
 
 70. Id. at 115–17. 
 71. Id. at 116–17. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 118–48. 
 75. Id. at 119, 122. 
 76. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial 
Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385–90 (2005); see also 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2144 (2002). 
 77. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (justifying, 
in response to a dissent by Justice Scalia, resort to legislative history even in a 
case where the statutory text is unambiguous); United States v. Thomp-
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Vermeule observes that this lack of coordination within the 
judiciary may significantly impact the effectiveness of various 
interpretive methods in reaching desired results.78 In particu-
lar, he suggests that “democracy-forcing” interpretive me-
thods—interpretive methods that purportedly improve legisla-
tive behavior—may increase judicial error costs if some, but not 
all, judges apply such methods.79 For example, some textualists 
argue that courts should disregard legislative history because 
doing so “fosters the democratic process” by compelling Con-
gress to ensure that it enacts its desires into statutory text.80 
However, even assuming that this strategy would have its de-
sired effect if all judges resolutely ignored legislative history, 
Vermeule observes that if only some judges refuse to consider 
legislative history, but most judges will consider it, then legis-
lators will expect courts to consider legislative history and will 
keep using it to communicate their intent to courts.81 The 
judges who refuse to consider legislative history will then miss 
this indicator of intent, possibly causing them to misinterpret 
statutes.82 
For this reason, it is incorrect to assume that an individual 
judge should choose an interpretive method simply because the 
method would have desirable effects if all judges applied it.83 
Vermeule calls this incorrect assumption the “fallacy of divi-
sion.”84 Because no judge can force another judge to adopt a 
particular method, Vermeule concludes that each judge must 
choose a method that will contribute at least marginal benefits 
to the overall judicial system even if other judges do not choose 
the same method.85 
C. VERMEULE’S PRESCRIPTION 
In light of the institutional concerns detailed above, 
Vermeule concludes that the most pressing questions in inter-
 
son/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (plurality opinion) (justifying 
resort to legislative history in response to a dissent by Justice Scalia). 
 78. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 118–48. 
 79. Id. at 118, 135–37. 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part). 
 81. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 135–36. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 135. 
 84. Id. at 121–22. 
 85. Id. at 121–23, 146–47. 
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pretation are not theoretical, but empirical.86 Scholars can en-
dlessly debate whether the ultimate goal of interpretation 
should be to discern the meaning of enacted text or, rather, the 
intent of those who enacted it. But what we really need to know 
is whether particular interpretive methods bring us closer to, or 
drive us further away from, either of these goals. The problem, 
then, is the empirical one of determining the actual value of in-
terpretive methods. Does reliance on legislative history, for ex-
ample, help or harm judicial efforts to discern legislative in-
tent? Vermeule complains that scholars have relied on intuition 
rather than hard evidence in answering this question.87 It is no 
good pointing to particular cases in which legislative history 
proved helpful, he says, because those cases might be more 
than balanced out by cases in which use of legislative history 
harms the interpretive enterprise.88 We need real empirical 
evidence on whether legislative history and other interpretive 
tools do more good than harm overall. 
The problem, of course, is that there is no real empirical 
evidence on the value of legislative history or other interpretive 
tools and, Vermeule notes, it may be impossible to obtain such 
evidence at a reasonable cost within a reasonable time.89 An 
empirical study on the usefulness of interpretive techniques 
would inevitably suffer from fuzzy categorization of “right” and 
“wrong” cases (who would determine which cases reached the 
“right” results?), uncertainty about the relevant variables, and 
the impossibility of performing direct experiments about the 
long-term effects of adopting particular interpretive regimes.90 
Unfortunately, judges cannot wait to decide cases until some-
one collects valid empirical data. Judges need a set of interpre-
tive techniques that are appropriate for use now, despite the 
paucity of empirical knowledge about the effectiveness of inter-
pretive techniques—hence, Professor Vermeule’s title, “Judging 
Under Uncertainty.” 
Vermeule attempts to develop a technique for “judging un-
der uncertainty” by borrowing from “decision theory.”91 Deci-
sion theory suggests that, in the face of uncertainty about the 
value of interpretive methods, one would, ideally, calculate the 
 
 86. Id. at 149, 153. 
 87. Id. at 108. 
 88. Id. at 90. 
 89. Id. at 158. 
 90. Id. at 158–62. 
 91. Id. at 171. 
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“expected” value of each method by multiplying each method’s 
various possible payoffs by the probability of each payoff.92 
However, not only are the payoffs of various interpretive me-
thods unknown, we do not have appropriate numbers—or even, 
Vermeule claims, reasonable estimates—to assign to their 
probabilities.93 Vermeule therefore turns to a more radical de-
cision technique: the “principle of insufficient reason,” which 
consists of assuming that unknown probabilities are equal, i.e., 
that the good and bad aspects of the unknowable effectiveness 
of proposed interpretive techniques cancel each other out.94 
Vermeule’s answer, in other words, focuses on those outcomes 
of interpretive methods that are knowable, and assumes that 
everything else washes out in the long run. 
Vermeule also notes several other decision theory tech-
niques, only one of which will be mentioned here: “satisfic-
ing.”95 This technique consists of searching among options only 
until finding a choice that is “good enough.”96 The satisficer 
contents herself with a good choice and does not demand the 
best choice.97 Armed with these techniques, Vermeule proceeds 
to offer prescriptions for judicial interpretation. 
1. Statutory Cases 
For statutory interpretation, Vermeule proposes that 
where the statutory text under consideration is unambiguous, 
courts should apply its clear meaning and ignore all other con-
siderations.98 He reaches this conclusion by applying the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason and the “satisficing” technique to the 
situation of courts in our legal system.99 
Vermeule observes that courts lack solid empirical data 
about the value of most interpretive techniques that go beyond 
enforcing the plain meaning of the immediately applicable sta-
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., id. at 192 (stating that “judges have almost no reliable in-
formation” about the reliability of legislative history or its effect on judicial 
error; its external costs and benefits are “at best difficult to specify and at 
worst wholly indeterminate”). 
 94. Id. at 173. 
 95. Id. at 176. I thought this was a contrived word, but according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary it has had the meaning Vermeule mentions since at 
least 1956. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 504 (2d ed. 1989). 
 96. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 176–77. 
 97. Id. at 177. 
 98. Id. at 183. 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 192–95. 
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tutory text, but they are in a good position to gauge one fact 
about these methods: their costs.100 Courts have a comparative 
advantage in assessing how interpretive methods affect litiga-
tion costs and judicial workloads.101 
Vermeule applies this insight to various interpretive tech-
niques, starting with judicial reliance on legislative history. As 
noted earlier, judges have little concrete information about how 
reliance on legislative history affects the reliability of their de-
cisions. Under the principle of insufficient reason courts would 
assume that this factor washes out—that, on balance, reliance 
on legislative history neither helps nor harms judicial efforts to 
reach the correct interpretations of statutes (on any view of 
correctness).102 But courts do know that legislative history is 
costly: it is expensive for counsel to research and for courts to 
consider.103 In the absence of any empirical reason to believe 
that legislative history increases the accuracy of courts’ deci-
sions, Vermeule suggests that courts save themselves and liti-
gants the cost of considering it.104 In other words, in the ab-
sence of data regarding which method of statutory 
interpretation is best, courts might as well select the cheapest. 
Of course, Vermeule acknowledges, minimizing costs is not 
the only goal105—we should not try to minimize costs at all 
costs, one might say—and it would be wrong to discard reliance 
on legislative history if there were no good alternative. But 
Vermeule suggests that there is a good alternative—simple re-
liance on clear statutory text.106 Such a method is “good 
enough,” and according to the satisficing technique, when faced 
with a method that produces “good enough” results, courts 
should not search for other methods that offer uncertain bene-
fits but certain and substantial costs.107 Again, the result is to 
discard reliance on legislative history. 
Vermeule reaches the same conclusion, for similar reasons, 
as to other techniques that go beyond simply enforcing clear 
statutory text. He rejects most of the “canons of construction,” 
because their benefits are uncertain, but their costs are defi-
 
 100. Id. at 166–68, 192–95. 
 101. Id. at 166–68. 
 102. Id. at 193. 
 103. Id. at 193–94. 
 104. Id. at 192–97. 
 105. Id. at 196. 
 106. See, e.g., id. at 183, 196–97. 
 107. Id. at 194. 
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nite.108 Occasionally, some default canon will be an inevitable 
necessity (for example, in the absence of any express statement, 
statutes must either be assumed to apply, or not to apply, 
extraterritorially).109 In that case, Vermeule asserts, courts 
should pick a default rule and be done with it.110 Otherwise, 
courts should abandon the canons and enforce statutory plain 
text.111 Similarly, comparison of statutory text to similar text in 
other statutes, which Vermeule dubs “holistic” statutory inter-
pretation, provides uncertain benefits, but definite costs, and 
should also be abandoned.112 
In cases where statutory text is not clear, but contains a 
gap or ambiguity, Vermeule argues that courts should defer to 
an administrative agency’s construction of the statute.113 Ad-
ministrative agencies, Vermeule argues, have a comparative 
advantage over courts in assessing statutory meaning, and this 
institutional advantage is the true reason for Chevron defe-
rence.114 Agencies have specialized expertise that puts them in 
a better position than courts to discern the true meaning of 
ambiguous text, and because each agency is a single organ that 
can interpret its own organic statute, agencies are free of the 
coordination problems courts encounter.115 Courts should there-
fore adopt agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes with-
out even attempting to use traditional tools of statutory con-
struction to narrow the ambiguity.116 For courts to use such 
tools duplicates the costs of agency interpretation without any 
certainty of a corresponding benefit.117 Again, cost minimiza-
tion is not the only goal, but accepting the agency’s interpreta-
 
 108. Id. at 198–202. 
 109. Id. at 200. 
 110. Id. at 201. 
 111. Id. at 201–02. 
 112. Id. at 202–05. 
 113. Id. at 206. 
 114. Id. at 207–08; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron deference is most conventionally justified 
on the theory that an ambiguous provision in a statute entrusted to an admin-
istrative agency constitutes an implicit delegation of power from Congress to 
the agency to resolve the statutory ambiguity. See id. at 844. Vermeule con-
tends that, in fact, Congress has neither required nor forbidden courts to 
adopt the Chevron principle and that its true justification lies in the agencies’ 
superior institutional ability to discern statutory meaning. VERMEULE, supra 
note 1, at 208–10. 
 115. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 208. 
 116. Id. at 211. 
 117. Id. at 210–11. 
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tion is “good enough,” and doing anything more risks incurring 
costs with no benefits.118 
2. Constitutional Cases 
Turning from statutory interpretation to constitutional in-
terpretation, Vermeule applies the same cost-benefit analysis. 
He argues that courts should enforce constitutional text that is 
clear and specific and should leave everything else—including 
enforcement of most of the Bill of Rights and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause—to other officials.119 Any other approach, he ar-
gues, incurs definite costs but provides only uncertain bene-
fits.120 
Vermeule acknowledges that this rule would entail dis-
carding some decisions that are near to our hearts, such as 
Brown v. Board of Education,121 but for every Brown, there is a 
Dred Scott122—i.e., a case in which the courts wrongly strike 
down the work of the political branches.123 If courts have the 
power of judicial review, they will inevitably make some bad 
uses of it; there is no way to get the good decisions without the 
bad ones.124 Thus, instead of focusing only on their favorite de-
cisions, lovers of judicial review must consider the whole range 
of decisions in order to determine whether judicial review pro-
duces not just good results, but net good results.125 
Vermeule again concludes that there is no way to answer 
this empirical question. There is no reason, he suggests, to be-
lieve that courts have an institutional advantage in interpret-
ing the Constitution.126 Article III courts are free of political 
pressure to conform to current majoritarian preferences, but 
that does not free them to come to correct constitutional deci-
sions; it just frees them to do whatever they please.127 Like 
courts interpreting statutes, courts that attempt to tackle am-
biguous constitutional text may make errors of interpretation, 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 230–31. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 231. 
 122. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 123. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 231, 241, 281. 
 124. Id. at 231. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 258–59, 273–75. 
 127. Id. at 258–59. 
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and we cannot empirically know whether those courts will, on 
balance, do more good than harm.128 
But we can know, once again, that sophisticated interpre-
tive methods are costly. The decision costs of constitutional in-
terpretive methods are high—originalism, for example, re-
quires extensive historical research.129 Moreover, judicial 
review adds a layer of uncertainty to the law that imposes ex-
tra costs by complicating planning—parties planning their 
primary conduct cannot simply rely on statutes but must con-
sider the possibility that courts will hold the statutes unconsti-
tutional.130 
While this aspect of his theory seems even more radical 
than his statutory interpretation prescription, Vermeule as-
sures the reader that eliminating judicial review will not lead 
to terrible results, such as tyranny.131 He notes that other lib-
eral democracies survive without judicial review.132 
Thus, once again, Vermeule maintains that doing anything 
other than enforcing clear text, and leaving the rest to other of-
ficials, incurs certain costs while yielding no certain benefit. 
Vermeule concludes that the courts’ interpretive role should be 
as humble in the constitutional arena as it is with regard to 
statutes. 
II.  RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE   
Professor Vermeule’s work poses a valuable and significant 
challenge to the community of interpretation scholars. Many of 
us, including myself, have written extensively about cases in 
which following plain statutory text leads to the wrong result 
and have argued for judicial power to deviate from statutory 
text in appropriate cases.133 There is considerable debate about 
which cases are “appropriate” for the exercise of such a judicial 
power—my own theory calls upon courts to discern the “back-
 
 128. Id. at 275. 
 129. Id. at 259. 
 130. Id. at 275–76. 
 131. Id. at 265. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 60; Eskridge, supra note 1; 
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 
B.U. L. REV. 1023 (1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism]; 
Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory 
Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Statutory 
Drafting Errors]; Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of 
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235. 
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ground principles” underlying the area of law of which a sta-
tute is a part and to use those principles as a guide, departing 
from statutory text only when the text deviates so surprisingly 
from background principles that such departure is justified134—
but some power of judicial reform is a common theme in the 
scholarly literature. 
Vermeule rightly asks those of us arguing for the existence 
of this power to consider whether we really have a basis to be-
lieve that the power will, on balance, do more good than harm. 
Vermeule rightly observes that once courts have the power to 
depart from statutory text, they will inevitably misuse that 
power in some cases.135 Therefore, for scholars to prove the val-
ue of our pet interpretive techniques, it is not enough to exhibit 
particular cases in which the power of judicial departure from 
statutory text will provide benefits; we must offer some reason 
to believe that the power offers net benefits in light of the pos-
sibility of judicial error. 
Vermeule also correctly draws attention to the costs that 
arise from litigation over whether a court should exercise the 
power to depart from statutory text in a given case—a power 
that, most agree, should be exercised rarely. Even I, who have 
delighted in collecting cases in which application of a strict tex-
tualism would make courts look silly, regard such cases as cu-
riosities. Most of the time, as Vermeule observes, simple appli-
cation of statutory text leads to what all interpreters regard as 
the correct result, because the other cues to which some inter-
preters would also look, such as legislative history or back-
ground principles, reinforce a statute’s apparent textual mean-
ing.136 Therefore, interpretation scholars who argue for judges 
to look beyond plain meaning are suggesting that courts and 
parties must bear the cost of engaging interpretive machinery 
that will make a difference only in unusual cases. Is the game 
worth the candle? 
Vermeule is not the first to attack widely used interpretive 
methods on the ground that they fail a cost-benefit test.137 Jus-
 
 134. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1033, 
1043–44, 1054; Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 348. 
 135. I have always acknowledged this. See Siegel, Textualism and Contex-
tualism, supra note 133, at 1110. 
 136. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 186 (noting that all interpretive me-
thods agree that clear and specific text is the single best source of interpretive 
information); Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 335 n.116 
(noting the convergence of interpretive methods in most cases). 
 137. For a more detailed look at Vermeule’s precursors, see Eskridge, supra 
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tice Scalia has long complained that judicial reliance on legisla-
tive history is a “waste of research time and ink” that “con-
demns litigants . . . to subsidizing historical research by law-
yers” while being, “on the whole . . . more likely to confuse than 
to clarify.”138 But Vermeule has taken the argument to a new 
level, making it the centerpiece of an entire theory of interpre-
tation. Vermeule challenges us to consider whether we have 
erred in relying on our armchair intuitions in the absence of 
empirical data about the value of interpretive methods. 
The remainder of this Article attempts to respond to 
Vermeule’s challenge. Part II.A first argues that some reliance 
on armchair intuition is inevitable in the choice of interpretive 
methods, and, indeed, that Vermeule relies on it no less than 
anyone else.139 Part II then suggests that to justify employing 
interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plain 
text, it should be enough to exhibit a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that the techniques have a positive net value, even if 
that value cannot be precisely gauged. This Article then at-
tempts to offer institutional reasons for such a belief.140 
A. COSTS: THE COSTS OF INTERPRETATION AND THE 
INEVITABILITY OF ARMCHAIR INTUITION 
Professor Vermeule criticizes interpretation scholars for re-
lying on their intuitions regarding the value of interpretive me-
thods in the absence of empirical data. His own theory, he be-
lieves, avoids this problem by focusing only on those costs and 
benefits of interpretive choices that courts would be in a good 
position to gauge. However, a closer look at the costs and bene-
fits involved reveals that Vermeule is as guilty of armchair em-
piricism as anyone else. He posits, without any real data, that 
the costs of the interpretive methods he desires to reject are 
“enormous,”141 and he disregards certain costs associated with 
his own proposals that might exceed the cost savings his me-
thods would provide. 
 
note 1, at 2044–50. 
 138. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia also sounded this theme in his book on in-
terpretation. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 139. See infra Part II.A. 
 140. See infra Part II.B–D. 
 141. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 194. 
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1. How Big Are These Costs, Really? 
A centerpiece of Professor Vermeule’s theory is his asser-
tion that interpretive methods that go beyond the application of 
plain text (or deference to administrative construction of ambi-
guous text) entail costs that are “enormous.”142 Theoretically, 
one might say that Vermeule’s argument does not depend on 
the size of these costs. If one adopts the “principle of insuffi-
cient reason” and assumes that the net benefits of interpretive 
techniques that look beyond plain text are zero, then courts 
should, in theory, jettison these techniques even if the resulting 
savings were very low—even a dollar of savings would beat zero 
dollars of foregone benefits. 
Still, if the costs of looking beyond plain text were really 
that low, we would all be better advised to argue about some-
thing else. Vermeule’s own notion of “satisficing” would suggest 
that the current interpretive system is “good enough” unless an 
alternative offers a substantial improvement.143 Thus, the en-
ticing notion that implementation of his theory could provide 
society with “enormous” cost savings is a central component of 
Vermeule’s arguments. 
It is notable, therefore, that Vermeule does not attempt to 
quantify the costs of the interpretive techniques he criticizes. 
He notes only that other interpretation scholars seem to agree 
that the costs are high.144 But given that Vermeule criticizes as 
“empirically far too ambitious”145 these same scholars’ estima-
tion that the benefits justify the costs, this agreement seems a 
slender reed on which to hang his theory. It is true that Profes-
sor Eskridge has said that the cost of researching legislative 
history “involves a very large number of dollars,”146 but Es-
kridge offers no data to support this judgment. Similarly, Jus-
tice Scalia estimates that when he was head of the Justice De-
partment’s Office of Legal Counsel, his staff spent sixty percent 
of its time researching legislative history.147 But if personal ex-
 
 142. Id. at 194, 210 (referring to the cost of researching legislative history 
and the cost of using traditional tools of statutory construction to review ad-
ministrative interpretation of statutes). 
 143. See id. at 175 (noting that invocation of the principle of insufficient 
reason seems most plausible when “the consideration given dispositive weight 
is . . . of the same order of importance as the discarded imponderables”). 
 144. E.g., id. at 193. 
 145. Id. 
 146. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 1509, 1541 (1998). 
 147. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 36–37; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Observa-
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perience provides sufficient data to measure the cost of relying 
on legislative history, I would add my own five and a half years 
of experience (one year as a law clerk and four and a half as an 
advocate in the Department of Justice). While I certainly re-
searched a substantial amount of legislative history, I never 
felt it was a particularly grinding burden, especially relative to 
the overall costs of litigation. Moreover, in at least one case, 
legislative history strongly influenced the litigation in my 
client’s favor, a benefit that seemed well worth the cost.148 
An evaluation of the cost of interpretive techniques relative 
to the overall cost of litigation seems particularly neglected in 
Vermeule’s theory. Indeed, even if Vermeule’s theory were fully 
adopted by every Article III judge tomorrow, litigation would 
hardly cease. Surely the lion’s share of litigation revolves 
around disputed facts, and not arguments about the law’s 
meaning. Even arguments about statutory interpretation 
would continue under Vermeule’s theory because his theory re-
tains for the courts the decision of whether statutory language 
is clear or ambiguous.149 The costs involved are not quantifia-
ble—Vermeule himself does not attempt to quantify them—but 
a consideration of the litigation that would remain gives some 
reason to doubt that the cost savings produced by Vermeule’s 
theory would be “enormous.” If the total savings would be 
something to the right of the decimal point, the argument for 
incurring costs to achieve the best possible methods of interpre-
tation is strengthened. 
This point was recently considered by another expert group 
of statutory interpreters, the British House of Lords. In decid-
ing whether to relax their rule against judicial consideration of 
legislative history, the Lords faced the cost question square-
ly.150 Over the “practical objection” of the Lord Chancellor that 
permitting such consideration might lead to “an immense in-
crease in the cost of litigation in which statutory construction is 
involved,”151 the leading opinion stated that “it is easy to over-
estimate the costs of such research,” and that while the new 
 
tions About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377 (noting 
that counsel must consult legislative history not only in litigation, but also in 
counseling clients). 
 148. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Fed. Highway Admin., 56 
F.3d 242, 246–47 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 149. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 188–89 (noting that judges may dis-
agree about whether statutory language is clear). 
 150. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 151. Id. at 614–16 (Lord Mackey, L.C., dissenting). 
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practice would “inevitably involve some increase in the use of 
time, this will not be significant.”152 This opinion was, it should 
be noted, based on the notion that courts would permit consul-
tation of legislative history only in limited cases—more limited 
than United States practice allows.153 Still, it shows that ex-
perts do not agree on how large the costs of interpretive tech-
niques are, and no one really has definitive information. 
2. How Much of the Costs Would Really Be Saved? 
But inasmuch as the costs of the interpretive techniques 
that Professor Vermeule attacks are unmeasurable, let us as-
sume that they are, at least, large. Even so, adopting Professor 
Vermeule’s theory would not necessarily avoid those costs. 
a. The Coordination Problem  
As noted earlier, Professor Vermeule chides interpretation 
scholars for committing the “fallacy of division”—that is, for as-
suming that methods of statutory interpretation that would re-
sult in benefits if adopted by the whole judiciary must also pro-
duce benefits even if adopted only by individual judges.154 
Vermeule contends that judges must adopt methods that pro-
duce benefits notwithstanding the choices of other judges. It is 
questionable, however, whether Vermeule’s theory satisfies this 
criterion. 
Vermeule contends that the benefits of adopting his theory 
are “marginal” or “divisible.”155 That is, he contends that each 
adoption of his theory by an individual judge will “reduce sys-
temic decision costs and legal uncertainty at the margin.”156 
Even if the full benefit of his theory were achieved only when 
adopted by all, or at least most, judges, he perceives costs de-
clining continuously as individual judges adopt his theory. 
However, this argument seems incorrect. Consider the ex-
ample of the costs of researching legislative history. With re-
gard to this particular interpretive tool, we have actual expe-
rience of what it is like to have Vermeule’s theory adopted by 
some, but not many, judges. For nearly twenty years now, Jus-
tice Scalia has engaged in a sustained campaign against re-
 
 152. Id. at 636–38. 
 153. Id. 
 154. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 121–22. 
 155. Id. at 226. 
 156. Id. 
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liance on legislative history,157 and some other judges have 
signed on.158 What costs have been avoided as a result of this 
campaign? Probably, none. 
Consider the plight of counsel arguing a statutory case be-
fore the Supreme Court. Counsel knows that citations to legis-
lative history are wasted on Justice Scalia, and perhaps even 
on some of his colleagues. Counsel also knows, however, that a 
majority of the Justices have expressly stated their willingness 
to consider legislative history despite Justice Scalia’s scorn for 
it.159 So long as most of the Justices will consider legislative 
history, prudent counsel will likely research, brief, and argue 
it.160 
An actual (if admittedly crude) empirical search bears out 
this intuition. LEXIS provides a database of Supreme Court 
briefs going back to 1979, so it is possible to compare citations 
to legislative history from the pre-Justice Scalia era to those of 
the present. A search for citations to House or Senate Reports 
in Supreme Court briefs from three five-year periods—one pe-
riod immediately before Justice Scalia arrived at the Court, one 







 157. Although Justice Scalia cited legislative history in some of his early 
opinions as a Justice, e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 379–81 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion), he soon started to complain about the use of legislative history. 
E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529–30 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). Subsequently, Justice Scalia carried his campaign against leg-
islative history to the point where he regularly declines to join portions of opi-
nions that cite legislative history, even where he joins the remainder of the 
opinion. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1998). This practice is ongoing. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. 
Co. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205 n.* (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia joined 
all of the Court’s opinion except for footnotes eleven and fifteen, which dis-
cussed legislative history). 
 158. Justice Thomas, for example, although not as doctrinaire about the 
matter as Justice Scalia, has occasionally joined him in rejecting the validity 
of reliance on legislative history. For example, he joined Justice Scalia in sug-
gesting that the Court should not “maintain the illusion that legislative histo-
ry is an important factor in this Court’s deciding of cases, as opposed to an 
omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds.” Thunder 
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 159. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993). 
 160. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 346. 
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Table 1: Citations to Legislative History in Supreme Court Briefs 
Time  
Period 
Briefs filed by 




House or  
Senate  
Reports162 
Percentage of briefs 




4111 1326 32.3% 
1/1/1991–
12/31/1995 
2510 905 36.1% 
1/1/2001–
12/31/2005 
2642 847 32.1% 
 
If Professor Vermeule’s argument that “marginal” benefits 
result as each judge adopts his theory were correct, one would 
expect to see a decline in citations to legislative history as a re-
sult of Justice Scalia’s sustained campaign against its consid-
eration. In fact, the rate of citations to legislative reports in-
creased somewhat in the early years of Justice Scalia’s 
campaign, and after some twenty years of the campaign the 
rate is virtually indistinguishable from what is was when Jus-
tice Scalia came to the Court in 1986. 
Similarly, the trend of the rate of citations to legislative 
reports over all completed years in the LEXIS database (1979–
2006)163 is almost completely flat, as shown in the following 
graph, in which the X-axis represents the year and the Y-axis is 
 
 161. As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and 
not DOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in LEXIS’s Supreme Court Briefs data-
base, with the specified date restrictions. All searches were conducted the 
week of June 18, 2007. Unfortunately, as I learned by conducting these 
searches in February 2007 and then again in June 2007, the data in the 
LEXIS databases seem to vary over time—documents appear in or disappear 
from the Supreme Court briefs database even for years long past. Thus, it may 
be impossible to reproduce these exact results. 
 162. As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and 
(“H.R. Rep.” or “S. Rep.”) and not DOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in LEXIS’s 
Supreme Court Briefs database, with the specified date restrictions. Note that 
this search counts each brief once, regardless of the number of times a brief 
cites legislative reports, so its measure of the amount of citation to legislative 
history is obviously not perfect. 
 163. As revealed by conducting the searches described in the last two foot-
notes, with year-by-year date restrictions. 
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the percentage of party briefs filed that year that cite legisla-
tive reports (expressed as a decimal):  
 
Figure 1: Citations to Legislative History in Supreme Court Briefs 
The slope of the best linear fit to the year-by-year data over 
all years is 0.00049.164 That is, citations to legislative reports 
are increasing, but the change is so small that it seems more 
accurate to conclude that a single Justice’s campaign against 
 
 164. The full data set showing changes in percentage of briefs citing legis-
lative history is: 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Supreme Court Briefs Citing  
Legislative History by Year 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
% 34.3 29.8 37.9 32.3 33.6 29.0 28.9 
 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
% 35.7 30.4 28.6 30.4 34.0 46.7 33.9 
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
% 41.5 32.9 34.2 32.7 34.9 38.9 38.8 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% 37.6 36.8 34.1 28.8 30.7 30.8 31.7 
 
In the above table, “%” means the percentage of party briefs citing legislative 
reports, as shown by the LEXIS Supreme Court Briefs database. The linear 
best-fit line was calculated by Quattro Pro. 
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legislative history has had no impact on the rate at which par-
ties rely upon it.165 
While these admittedly crude data do not fully measure the 
overall cost of legislative history research, they support the in-
tuition that counsel will not decrease their use of legislative 
history simply because individual judges or Justices refuse to 
consider it in reaching a decision.166 Indeed, even if a majority 
 
 165. The above tables and chart consider only briefs filed by parties. The 
reason for this is that amicus briefs tend to cite legislative history at a differ-
ent rate than that of party briefs (in the whole LEXIS database from 1979–
2006, 33.1% of party briefs cite legislative reports, but only 27.1% of amicus 
briefs do so), and amicus briefs have been increasing (or at least, their repre-
sentation in the LEXIS database has been increasing) over time: from 1981–
1985, the database contains 45.0% as many amicus briefs as party briefs; from 
2001–2005, it contains 62.3% as many amicus briefs as party briefs. Thus, 
consideration of trends in citation to legislative reports in all briefs might re-
veal an apparent decrease in citation rates that could really just be an artifact 
of the increasing percentage of amicus briefs (which cite legislative history 
less) in the database. It is therefore necessary to look only at the same kind of 
brief when doing a multiyear comparison. 
The overall trend in citations to legislative reports in the amicus briefs 
considered as a separate group, like the trend in the party briefs, is almost 
completely flat. The slope of the trend line is −0.00056. Thus, while this trend 
is technically decreasing, the effect is minuscule. Moreover, even if one does 
look at all briefs, the slope of the overall trend line is −0.00020, again suggest-
ing no impact from a single Justice’s sustained campaign against legislative 
history. 
Note also that the above data consider citations to legislative reports, not 
to legislative history more generally. Legislative reports are the most impor-
tant form of legislative history, see Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 
(1984), so it seems reasonable to focus on them. Similar searches for citations 
to the Congressional Record in Supreme Court party briefs from 1979–2006 
reveal that the slope of the trend line in their citation is −0.0013. Searches for 
citations to committee hearings over the same period show a trend line with a 
slope of −0.00023. Again, these are decreases, but only negligible decreases. 
Searching for all citations to all three forms of legislative history in party 
briefs for the same period reveals a trend line with a slope of 0.0015—an in-
crease, but only a negligible increase. 
Thus, while different indicators could be chosen to portray a tiny increase 
or tiny decrease in citations to legislative history, the data overall really sug-
gest that Justice Scalia’s refusal to consider legislative history has simply had 
no effect on the use of legislative history by parties to Supreme Court litiga-
tion. 
 166. Some previous studies have suggested that Justice Scalia’s campaign 
against legislative history has had a notable effect; these studies have gauged 
the impact by counting cases in which the Supreme Court itself has relied, or 
not relied, on legislative history. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the 
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355–56 (1994) (provid-
ing statistics regarding the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of legislative 
history and concluding that “in slightly more than a decade the Court has 
moved from a position in which legislative history was routinely considered in 
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of the Court disregarded legislative history and only a minority 
continued to consider it, counsel would likely continue to brief 
and argue it, because a single Justice’s vote could prove crucial 
in deciding a case.167 It would be uncharacteristic for a lawyer 
to omit arguments that might prove helpful. When plaintiff ’s 
counsel in Gibbons v. Ogden concluded his Supreme Court ar-
gument with a peroration that quoted Virgil’s Aeneid,168 his op-
ponent did not simply respond, “Virgil is not authority.” In-
stead, he explained in a three-page peroration of his own why 
the quotation from the Aeneid actually supported his side of the 
case.169 If lawyers will expend costs to respond to a literary al-
lusion to a poet who has been dead two thousand years, they 
are unlikely to neglect arguments based on legislative history 
that at least some Supreme Court Justices will consider.170 
This same reasoning applies to arguments based on the other 
interpretive techniques that Vermeule would have judges ab-
andon. 
Vermeule is probably correct that, at some point, some cost 
savings would accrue from his theory even if it were not un-
iversally adopted. If eight out of nine Supreme Court Justices 
renounced reliance on legislative history, counsel might de-
crease expenditures devoted to researching and briefing legisla-
tive history, preferring to put most of their energy into matters 
that would likely prove more productive.171 But the actual ex-
perience of having an individual Justice reject legislative histo-
 
all cases, to a situation in which it is considered by the controlling opinion in 
only a small minority of decisions” and that “in most cases, it is not mentioned 
at all”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
656–57 (1990) (providing similar statistics). However, the Court’s reduced re-
liance on legislative history does not imply that any resources will be saved, 
because, as the statistics presented herein suggest, counsel will still research 
and brief legislative history even if the Court might not rely on it in a given 
case. Of course, some slight savings would arise from any individual judge’s 
refusal to consider legislative history—that judge’s time will be saved, if noth-
ing else. But given the ratio of resources expended by parties to those ex-
pended by courts, these savings may be dismissed as trivial. 
 167. Rosenkranz, supra note 76, at 2144. 
 168. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 158 (1824) (argument of Mr. Em-
mett). 
 169. Id. at 183–86 (argument of the Attorney General). 
 170. But see VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 103–04 (noting that the govern-
ment declined to argue the legislative history in the Holy Trinity Church case 
and said only that legislative intent should be gathered from the statute it-
self ) . 
 171. Professor Vermeule kindly drew my attention to this point in an e-
mail exchange. 
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ry suggests that the costs of the interpretive techniques that 
Vermeule disfavors will not decline continuously as more and 
more judges reject them. Rather, it would seem that a “critical 
mass” of judges must adopt the theory before it has its desired 
cost-reducing effect.172 
Thus, the coordination problem to which Professor Verme-
ule calls attention has the potential to sap a considerable part 
of his theory’s benefits. Of course, this objection may seem a lit-
tle unfair. As Vermeule notes, most interpretation scholars do 
not worry about the fallacy of division; they just imagine that 
courts will adopt their pet theory en masse and execute it per-
fectly.173 The next Section examines whether Vermeule’s theory 
will produce cost savings under this more typical, Panglossian 
assumption. But inasmuch as the main virtue of Vermeule’s 
theory is supposed to be that it takes proper account of the 
structure of our actual interpretive institutions, it is only fair to 
observe that, given the structural reality that individual judges 
adopting Vermeule’s theory will lack power to force their col-
leagues to fall into line, the cost savings that are the theory’s 
main benefit seem unlikely to materialize.174 
b. Offsetting Costs 
The coordination problem is not the only obstacle to achiev-
ing the cost savings predicted by Professor Vermeule’s theory. 
Even if Vermeule’s book captured the attention and the adhe-
rence of the entire Article III judiciary, the cost savings of his 
theory would remain speculative. 
The problem is that Vermeule focuses on some costs while 
neglecting other, offsetting costs. One reason that courts some-
times look beyond the plain text of statutes is that the result 
 
 172. Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 226 (denying that adoption of his 
theory by a critical mass of judges is necessary for it to have a beneficial ef-
fect). Another possibility, suggested to me by my colleague Michael Abramo-
wicz, is that individual adoptions of Vermeule’s theory could at first each pro-
duce a slight cost savings, with a substantial savings coming if a critical mass 
of judges adopted the theory. Vermeule would then, literally, be correct that 
judges could contribute marginally to cost savings by adopting his theory, but 
it would be important to note that the savings might be trivial or small until a 
critical mass of judges went along. 
 173. Id. at 123–25. 
 174. This Section has focused on litigation, but similar remarks would ap-
ply to the costs of client counseling and social planning more generally. If 
counsel cannot know whether the judges who might ultimately decide an issue 
would rely on legislative history, they will have little choice but to consider it 
as one factor when counseling clients and planning behavior. 
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indicated by the plain text appears costly. Consider, for exam-
ple, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.175 In this well-
known case, the Supreme Court considered § 309 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, which instructs the Federal Commu-
nications Commission to evaluate applications for broadcast li-
censes.176 The text of the statute clearly provided that if the 
Commission denied an application (and maintained that denial 
after giving the applicant a second chance), it was required to 
“formally designate the application for hearing.”177 It further 
provided that “[a]ny hearing subsequently held upon such ap-
plication” would be a “full hearing” in which the applicant could 
participate.178 Despite this clear statutory command, the Su-
preme Court approved the agency’s determination that it was 
not required to hold a hearing after denying an application if 
the application, on its face, did not satisfy valid agency rules 
implementing the Communications Act.179 As I have described 
in detail elsewhere,180 the Court elevated background prin-
ciples of administrative law above the dictates of statutory text: 
in light of the background principle that hearings exist to re-
solved disputed facts,181 the Court concluded that Congress did 
not intend the agency to “waste time on applications that do 
not state a valid basis for a hearing.”182 
Imagine, however, that the Court had adopted Professor 
Vermeule’s theory. That theory would have obliged the Court to 
implement the clear statutory text, and would have required 
the agency, therefore, to conduct costly, pointless hearings—
perhaps hundreds per year.183 Presumably, if the costs had 
 
 175. United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). For a detailed 
discussion of this case, see Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 
133, at 1045–49. 
 176. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 192–205. 
 177. Id. at 195–96 n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1952)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 205. The agency had denied the particular application in ques-
tion on the ground that it had previously determined by rule that it would not 
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity (the statutory standard 
for granting an application) to grant a broadcast license to a party that al-
ready had five such licenses, and the application revealed that the applicant 
already did have five. See id. at 194 n.1, 195, 197. 
 180. See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 133, at 1045–
49. 
 181. See Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 202. 
 182. Id. at 205. 
 183. The FCC receives hundreds of applications for broadcast licenses 
every year, and it denies, dismisses, or returns hundreds without designating 
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been great enough, the agency would have persuaded Congress 
to rewrite the statute, but that too would have entailed consi-
derable costs in the form of congressional time. 
The point of this example is that a firm decision to imple-
ment clear statutory text no matter what may save some judi-
cial costs, but it will likely increase other costs. Congress will 
have to bear the costs of correcting foolish decisions resulting 
from following plain text. Society will have to bear the costs of 
living under foolish decisions until they are corrected.184 
Moreover, if courts insist on following plain text no matter 
what, Congress will incur increased costs because it will have 
to draft statutes more precisely. Interpretive techniques that go 
beyond enforcement of plain text permit Congress to save time 
and resources in the drafting process. When giving any instruc-
tions to anyone, the giver relies on a host of background inter-
pretive understandings that permit the instructions to be given 
in a reasonably concise form.185 For example, when a boss tells 
a secretary, “this task is urgent—finish it before you leave the 
building today,” the boss does not add, “but if the building 
catches on fire, you can leave without finishing the task.” How-
ever, if the secretary interprets the boss’s instructions literally, 
this qualification, as well as many others, would be necessary. 
Similarly, if courts insist on following Congress’s apparently 
clear textual instructions no matter how absurd the result, 
Congress will have to expend more energy drafting literal, 
judge-proof instructions.186 
As a statutory example, consider the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, which provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”187 As the Supreme Court has long noted, 
this statute “cannot mean what it says,”188 because, if applied 
 
them for hearing. See, e.g., 63 FCC ANN. REP. 23 (1997). 
 184. Professor Eskridge called attention to similar costs in responding to 
similar arguments from Justice Scalia. See Eskridge, supra note 146, at 1541–
42. 
 185. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28–30 
(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970) (1839); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat,” 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 (1995) (discuss-
ing Lieber’s famous example). 
 186. Cf. LIEBER, supra note 185, at 30–32 (complaining that strict interpre-
tive principles used by British judges complicate the task of Parliament). 
 187. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006). 
 188. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’ l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978). 
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literally, it would outlaw virtually all private commercial con-
tracts, inasmuch as restraint is the very essence of such con-
tracts.189 Congress, however, saved itself time and energy by 
legislating in this broad and vague fashion, and leaving the rest 
to judicial implementation. If the courts had insisted on apply-
ing the letter of the law to outlaw all private contracts, not only 
would substantial social costs have resulted directly, but Con-
gress would have been forced to expend resources to overturn 
the decision and to craft a statute that the judges could enforce 
properly. 
Vermeule would presumably predict that these costs, as-
suming them to exist, would be balanced by cost savings from 
his theory. Yes, Congress would have to expend energy over-
turning foolish judicial decisions that refuse to depart from 
plain text, but Congress would also save energy by not having 
to overturn decisions that wrongly depart from plain text. Simi-
larly, other social actors would have to live with foolish deci-
sions implementing plain text until Congress could overturn 
them, but they would be saved the burden of dealing with deci-
sions that wrongly depart from plain text. According to Verme-
ule, under the “principle of insufficient reason,” any analysis 
should assume these costs and benefits cancel each other out.190 
The principle of insufficient reason, however, is a double-
edged sword. If unknowable quantities are assumed to cancel 
each other out, the principle should be applied more broadly. As 
this Section shows, adopting Vermeule’s interpretive methods 
would entail a substantial and unknowable shift in costs of 
many kinds, including judicial costs, legislative costs, and other 
social costs. Following the principle of insufficient reason 
should lead to the conclusion that all of the imponderable costs 
and benefits that would accrue to Vermeule’s theory would can-
cel each other out. 
Vermeule would say that the judicial cost savings from his 
theory are distinct from all other costs, because their direction 
is certain and because courts are uniquely well-positioned to 
gauge these costs, while they are not in a good position to gauge 
other types of costs.191 But, as the previous Sections have sug-
gested, it is far from clear how big these costs are, or how much 
of them would really be saved. Indeed, it is not even clear that 
Vermeule’s methods will always reduce judicial costs. As Chev-
 
 189. Id.; Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 190. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
 191. See id. at 166–68. 
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ron litigation under the current system shows, considerable de-
bate can arise over whether statutory text is clear or ambi-
guous,192 and, under Vermeule’s theory, courts would continue 
to make this determination. One can imagine cases in which a 
court looking only at the text might need to expend considera-
ble energy deciding whether the text is clear or ambiguous, 
whereas other clues beyond the text might settle the matter 
fairly easily if the court consulted them.193 While these clues 
may not help often, they may sometimes, and under the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason, unknowables cancel one another 
out.194 
The point overall is this: Vermeule accuses interpretation 
scholars of either neglecting institutional considerations entire-
ly, or, at best, sitting lazily in their academic armchairs and 
simply dreaming about institutional costs and benefits, appar-
ently unaware that they lack actual, empirical data. But it is 
not clear that Vermeule himself can do any better. Vermeule 
offers some intuitive reasons for privileging one particular in-
sight about costs and benefits and then invokes the “principle 
of insufficient reason,” seemingly a fancy term for “let’s ignore 
everything else.” But it is not clear that the costs and benefits 
he privileges are of the “enormous” magnitude he claims; it is 
not clear that the savings he ascribes to his theory would really 
materialize; and it is not clear to what degree the savings 
would be offset by increases in other costs. 
It therefore seems that a certain amount of armchair intui-
 
 192. See id. at 189 (“Judges can . . . hold different views about whether sta-
tutory language is clear.”). The recent case of Zuni Public School District No. 
89 v. Department of Education, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007), provides an excellent 
example: it required Supreme Court litigation to determine whether the sta-
tute involved was clear or ambiguous, and, even then, five Justices thought 
the agency’s interpretation was a permissible reading of an ambiguous sta-
tute. See id. at 1546. Four Justices however, thought the statute so clear that 
the agency’s construction deserved no deference. See id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 193. More generally, it is always possible that the interpretive techniques 
Vermeule rejects could make the law easier to interpret in a given case, and 
thus their use in that case could save costs. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), the British case noted earlier (in which the 
House of Lords relaxed its rule against consulting legislative history), provides 
an example. The judges felt that the statutory text was ambiguous and that 
the two possible interpretations were “nicely balanced,” but that the legisla-
tive history made the true construction of the statute clear. Id. at 640–42. In 
such a case, a system that rejected legislative history would impose larger 
costs of uncertainty and litigation than one that permitted its use. 
 194. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 173. 
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tion is an inevitable part of the debate in this area. If it is good 
enough for Vermeule, it should be good enough for the rest of 
us. Until someone gathers actual, empirical data, we can, and 
indeed must, deploy our intuitions as to the directions of cost 
and benefit shifts that would result from adoption of various in-
terpretive methods. Vermeule offers one intuitive insight, 
which is not provably wrong, but which is also not provably 
right. The remaining Sections of this Article offer competing in-
sights. Each Section responds to Vermeule’s challenge by offer-
ing institutional reasons as to why we might be able to gauge 
the direction of benefits that accrue to current interpretive me-
thods. 
B. BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES 
As noted earlier, Professor Vermeule’s theory is essentially 
that we do not know whether interpretive techniques that go 
beyond enforcement of plain text provide any benefit, but we do 
know that they are expensive, so we should discard them and 
save the expense. The previous Sections questioned one pillar 
of this theory—that an “enormous” cost savings would result 
from discarding the interpretive techniques that he disfavors—
and instead suggested that the effect on costs is unknowable. 
This Section challenges the other pillar of the theory: 
Vermeule’s assertion that we cannot gauge the benefits of in-
terpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plain text. 
Vermeule asserts not just that the justification for these tech-
niques is less than fully persuasive, but that there is no reason 
to think that these techniques, on balance, do more good than 
harm.195 For example, regarding holistic textualism, a method 
of interpretation appealing to sources beyond the statute’s text 
to ascertain meaning, Vermeule says that “there is no particu-
lar reason to think that the illuminating effect of holistic tex-
tualism will predominate over its error-producing effect.”196 He 
similarly states that “there is no reason at all to think that the 
tools of judicial gap-filling are superior to agency interpreta-
tion”197 and that “[t]here is no particular reason to believe that 
judges are better positioned than legislators to update constitu-
tional principles and rules through incremental decision-
making over time.”198 
 
 195. See, e.g., id. at 205, 210, 273–74. 
 196. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
 197. Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
 198. Id. at 273–74 (emphasis added). 
 420 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:387 
 
Vermeule’s contention that there is no reason to believe in 
the value of certain interpretive techniques is essential to his 
theory of interpretation. Both Vermeule’s appeal to the “prin-
ciple of insufficient reason” and his assumption that the costs 
and benefits of interpretive techniques that go beyond plain 
text wash each other out are valid only if we really have no ba-
sis for estimating the probability that these interpretive tech-
niques will help or harm. Even a modest shift in the probabili-
ties—say, if certain interpretive techniques led courts astray in 
forty percent of the cases, but were helpful in the remaining 
sixty percent—would undermine the “washing out” hypothesis 
fundamental to Vermeule’s theory.199 
This Section suggests that there is some reason to believe 
that courts can, on balance, reach better results by employing 
techniques other than straightforward enforcement of statutory 
texts. The reasons are institutional. As noted earlier, one of 
Vermeule’s central points is that the choice of interpretive me-
thods should be informed by institutional considerations,200 and 
he permits some elements of his overall cost-benefit analysis to 
be privileged (and thus exempt from the principle of insuffi-
cient reason) on the basis of what is essentially a probabilistic 
judgment that courts are in a good institutional position to 
gauge them.201 Therefore, it should be equally legitimate to rely 
on institutional reasons why courts are well-positioned to look 
beyond plain statutory text in certain respects. 
The first critical institutional consideration, which I have 
highlighted elsewhere, is that courts act at the moment the sta-
tutory text is actually applied to a particular case.202 In con-
trast to legislatures, which act generally and in advance, and 
thus cannot anticipate every circumstance to which statutes 
will apply,203 courts are better positioned to use certain inter-
pretive techniques. Consider, for example, the interpretive 
principle that courts should construe statutes so as to avoid ab-
surd results. Vermeule does not definitively state what should 
happen to this principle under his theory, and it is a principle 
accepted even by most textualist judges and scholars.204 How-
 
 199. See id. at 174. 
 200. Id. at 15–39. 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 192 (arguing that courts are in a good position to gauge 
the litigation costs imposed by judicial resort to legislative history). 
 202. See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 341–43. 
 203. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994). 
 204. Justice Scalia, for example, approves it. See Holloway v. United 
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ever, based on Vermeule’s arguments, the absurd results prin-
ciple would have to go. Vermeule observes that judges applying 
the principle may err; they may erroneously identify a statuto-
ry application as absurd because of their insufficient ability to 
perceive the policies and purposes of the statute.205 In the ab-
sence of any hard data as to the rate of correct versus mistaken 
applications of the absurd results principle, Vermeule would 
presumably appeal to the “principle of insufficient reason” and 
conclude the rates are equal.206 Thus, he would conclude that 
the value of permitting courts to apply the absurd results prin-
ciple is speculative, but its costs are definite—it increases liti-
gation and decision costs and introduces uncertainty into the 
law.207 Therefore, it should be discarded.208 
However, because of their institutional feature that they 
act at the moment of statutory implementation, courts can 
probably produce net benefits by applying the absurdity prin-
ciple. Legislatures are institutionally disadvantaged when it 
comes to appreciating the potential absurdity of what they 
write. No matter how much work they do in advance, they will 
make some mistakes that come to light only afterwards.209 
Courts, on the other hand, are in a position to see the statute 
after the drafting process, when its absurdity may be apparent 
in light of the particular case in which it arises. 
Another institutional feature that promotes the courts’ ca-
pacity to apply the absurdity principle is the availability of 
judicial time to focus on discrete statutory provisions. Vermeule 
emphasizes the limited time and attention of courts,210 which is 
certainly a valid point, but at least courts faced with an argu-
 
States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laun-
dry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA, 
supra note 2, at 20. 
 205. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 20, 37. 
 206. See id. at 173–75. 
 207. See id. at 18–24. 
 208. Vermeule expressly discusses and rejects only some interpretive tech-
niques that go beyond implementation of plain text, particularly, looking to 
legislative history, applying canons of construction, and “holistically” compar-
ing statutory text to other statutory text. Id. at 183–229. Still, rejection of all 
techniques that go beyond implementation of plain text is implicit in Verme-
ule’s overall conclusion that “[w]hen the statutory text directly at hand is clear 
and specific, judges should stick close to its surface or apparent meaning, 
eschewing the use of other tools to enrich their sense of meaning, intentions, 
or purposes.” Id. at 183. 
 209. See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note 133, at 341–43. 
 210. E.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that courts “operate un-
der significant constraints of time, information, and expertise”). 
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ment that statutory text dictates an absurd result can take the 
time necessary to consider the argument. The hurly-burly of 
the legislative process, on the other hand, and the need to vote 
up or down on an entire statute at the moment it comes before 
the legislature for a vote, put the legislature in a less advanta-
geous position to discover absurdities in individual statutory 
provisions. 
None of this is to suggest that courts exercising the power 
to deviate from clear—but absurd—statutory text will always 
do so correctly. Once a power of deviation exists, it seems im-
possible to deny Vermeule’s charge that courts will sometimes 
use it unwisely.211 But it does suggest that there are reasons—
institutional reasons—why legislatures, even if made up of leg-
islators who individually are perfectly reasonable and rational, 
will write absurdities into statutory text that courts will later 
discover. It also suggests that when a court, acting with due re-
gard for the presumption that the legislature meant what it 
said, concludes that the legislature cannot have meant what it 
said because what it said is absurd, the court’s conclusion likely 
has some merit because the court has an institutional advan-
tage over the legislature in the discovery of statutory absurdity. 
And that is all one needs to refute Vermeule’s theory. 
There is no need to quantify the exact probabilities involved. 
Vermeule’s theory, particularly his invocation of the “principle 
of insufficient reason,” depends critically on the assumption 
that judicial reliance on extratextual interpretive techniques 
such as the rule against absurd results has zero net benefit. 
This assumption is valid only if we assume that a judicial deci-
sion based on the absurdity principle is as likely to be wrong as 
to be right. If the likelihood of correct judicial implementation 
of the absurdity principle even slightly outweighs the likelihood 
of incorrect implementation, then the assertion that the prin-
ciple has no benefit collapses, and with it, the conclusion that 
we should discard the principle to avoid its costs. Rather, we 
must compare the costs of implementing the absurdity prin-
ciple against its benefits and, since both are unmeasurable, the 
possibility remains that the benefits exceed its costs. 
This line of argument does not refute all of Vermeule’s con-
clusions. The courts’ comparative advantage that results from 
their interpretation of statutory text at the moment of imple-
mentation says nothing, for example, about the usefulness of 
 
 211. See id. at 20, 192–94. 
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legislative history. It does, however, suggest that courts have a 
similar comparative advantage at detecting statutory drafting 
errors by applying background principles of law. As I have dis-
cussed at length elsewhere, the absurdity principle does not ful-
ly capture the set of cases in which courts should be able to de-
viate from statutory text.212 A statute’s startling departure 
from background principles of law may indicate that the sta-
tute is erroneously drafted even if following the statute’s literal 
text would not produce an “absurd” result.213 Courts should 
have the power to deviate from statutory text in such cases214 
and, again, contrary to Vermeule’s conclusions,215 institutional 
features of courts support this view. The fact that courts in-
terpret statutes at the moment of implementation puts them in 
a good position to detect startling deviations from background 
understandings that escaped detection in the legislative 
process.216 This institutional advantage suggests that courts 
can likely produce net benefits by using the process of interpre-
tation to maintain statutory coherence with background prin-
ciples of law.217 
In sum, Vermeule goes too far in asserting that there is no 
reason to think that courts can add value to the interpretive 
process by sometimes departing from plain text. There is some 
reason, stemming from institutional features of courts. The fea-
tures do not come with concrete numbers, but neither does 
Vermeule’s own reasoning. 
C. THE ROLE OF AGENCIES 
So far, this Article has considered only what Professor 
Vermeule calls “Type 1” cases, that is, cases in which the statu-
tory text immediately at hand is clear and specific.218 In “Type 
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2” cases, in which courts must apply ambiguous statutory text, 
Vermeule advises courts to defer to administrative or other ex-
ecutive construction of the statute, without consulting tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction to try to resolve the ambi-
guity.219 As noted earlier, Vermeule rejects the formal, 
conventional justification for deference—that ambiguous agen-
cy statutes constitute an implicit delegation of power from 
Congress to the agencies to resolve the ambiguities.220 Rather, 
he relies on practical, institutional considerations. He reasons 
that agencies are better positioned than courts to understand 
the meanings of the statutes they administer, and judicial use 
of traditional tools of statutory construction to review an agen-
cy’s interpretation would entail duplicative costs and add to le-
gal uncertainty without offering any likely benefit.221 
Vermeule is surely onto something here. I have argued at 
length elsewhere that the background principles of any area of 
law are necessary guides to construing statutes related to that 
area.222 If that is true, then it makes sense to desire that sta-
tutes be construed by those with the best understanding of 
those background principles. Agencies, like courts, have the in-
stitutional advantage of construing statutes in the course of 
their implementation. Thus, courts gain no edge over agencies 
on this point, and agencies have the further advantage of spe-
cialized subject-matter expertise. Putting aside exceptions such 
as the Federal Circuit (which, because of its specialized juris-
diction, might be expected to know as much about patent law 
as the Patent Office),223 agencies will know more about their 
organic statutes, which they administer on a daily basis, and be 
better able to discern the background principles underlying 
those statutes, than a court that may encounter an agency’s 
statute only sporadically. Moreover, as Vermeule observes, 
each agency is a single organ that can produce a unified con-
struction of a statute, whereas the process of producing a coor-
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dinated judicial interpretation is rather clumsy and ineffi-
cient.224 
Thus, it might seem that those who preach the virtues of 
background principles as a guide to statutory interpretation 
would be the most enthusiastic supporters of Professor Verme-
ule’s proposed regime of strong deference to agency interpreta-
tions. Again, however, Vermeule’s analysis gives too little 
weight to institutional advantages of courts. The previous Sec-
tion focused on institutional advantages stemming from a vital 
difference between the courts and Congress, namely, that 
courts interpret statutes at the moment of application.225 Here, 
the key is the most vital difference between courts and agen-
cies, namely, the courts’ advantage in providing checks and 
balances. Once again, the courts’ institutional position gives 
them a vital role to play in statutory interpretation that cannot 
be properly fulfilled by applying Vermeule’s theory. 
Vermeule gives only passing attention to the role that se-
paration-of-powers considerations should play in the choice of 
interpretive methods. He takes note of the political insulation 
of courts, but considers it only in relation to the courts’ inter-
pretive capabilities, and he does not believe it gives courts any 
comparative advantage over agencies in that regard.226 Politi-
cally responsive agencies, he suggests, will be closer to the leg-
islative process and more familiar with a statute’s original pur-
pose than courts, and better able to discern those purposes 
from legislative history.227 The political insulation of courts 
frees them, Vermeule acknowledges, from the pressure to con-
strue statutes in accordance with current majoritarian desires, 
but that does not mean they will do better than agencies at un-
derstanding a statute’s original meaning.228 
In offering such a stingy view of the courts’ potential value, 
Vermeule gives too little weight to the courts’ vital role of 
checking the executive. This role arises not merely from the 
courts’ political insulation, but from their status as a separate 
branch of government that does not participate in the primary 
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formulation or execution of policy.229 If that role were removed, 
executive agencies would have a greatly enhanced ability to set 
the limits of their own power.230 The executive has a strong 
tendency to aggrandize its own power even with courts playing 
the role that they play now;231 one shudders to think what 
would happen if the courts did not play a checking role. 
Consider, for example, the current administration’s asser-
tion that Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), enacted after September 11, 2001, authorizes the 
President to order warrantless electronic surveillance of per-
sons within the United States.232 Under Vermeule’s interpre-
tive theory, because the President’s claimed statutory authority 
for his surveillance power—the AUMF’s simple statement that 
the President is “authorized to use all necessary and appropri-
ate force” against those who planned, authorized, or committed 
the 9/11 attacks233—is less than perfectly clear, courts should 
defer to the executive’s construction without even considering 
traditional canons of statutory construction.234 These canons, 
such as the canons that the specific controls the general,235 or 
that repeals by implication are disfavored,236 might lead to the 
conclusion that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act still 
governs domestic electronic surveillance and the President’s 
claimed power does not exist.237 
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Of course, consistent with his “washing out” theory, 
Vermeule would presumably assert that while courts might 
rightly prevent the executive from invading civil liberties, they 
might just as well wrongly prevent the executive from engaging 
in surveillance that is necessary to prevent terrorism. With no 
basis for believing that the courts will understand congression-
al instructions any better than the agencies, the principle of in-
sufficient reason would suggest that good and bad court deci-
sions will cancel each other out. Therefore, Vermeule would 
conclude, judicial review of agency interpretations of ambi-
guous statutes incurs costs but provides no benefit, and so 
courts should not engage in such review. 
Again, however, institutional considerations suggest that 
we can at least predict the sign of the value of judicial review of 
agency interpretations, even if we cannot estimate its exact 
magnitude. The critical institutional consideration here is the 
natural tendency of the executive to aggrandize its own power. 
The judiciary’s comparative advantage arises not only from its 
political insulation, but also from its removal from primary pol-
icy formulation and implementation. The executive is moti-
vated in part by its desire to give itself the broadest powers 
that will permit the maximum implementation of its preferred 
policies. The judiciary cannot wrest the primary policy role 
from the executive; all it can do is check the executive’s tenden-
cies.238 The judiciary’s limited role in reviewing the executive’s 
action for legality rather than in formulating policy also re-
stricts the judiciary.239 While the judiciary will not perform its 
function perfectly, we can expect that it will serve as a valuable 
counterweight to the executive’s natural self-aggrandizing ten-
dencies.240 This benefit is sufficient ground for incurring the 
costs of maintaining the judicial role in reviewing agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutes. As the previous Section ex-
plained, to defeat Vermeule’s application of the principle of in-
sufficient reason, we need only some reason to believe that 
maintaining the judicial role will be more beneficial than harm-
ful.241 
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D. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Professor Vermeule’s theory of statutory interpretation 
could conceivably attract some adherents; his theory of consti-
tutional interpretation seems unlikely to do so. Vermeule re-
cognizes that many will find this part of his theory “beyond the 
pale.”242 Still, he rightly offers the same challenge to constitu-
tional theorists as to statutory interpretation scholars: can we 
really know that judicial review produces, not just some good 
cases, but net benefits overall? Once again, it is necessary to of-
fer institutional reasons to believe that judicial review does 
more good than harm. 
In a recent book chapter, I suggested some such reasons.243 
Perceiving them requires looking beyond the institutional fea-
ture of courts upon which Vermeule primarily focuses: the 
courts’ insulation from politics.244 As noted earlier, Vermeule 
rejects the notion that political insulation puts courts in a bet-
ter position than political actors to interpret the Constitu-
tion.245 However, the institutional advantage of the judiciary 
with regard to constitutional interpretation lies not only in the 
judiciary’s political insulation, but also in a constellation of in-
stitutional features that make the judiciary the branch best po-
sitioned to give constitutional guarantees real meaning. 
To see the judiciary’s advantage, consider Vermeule’s sug-
gestion that constitutional guarantees (other than those that 
are quite clear and specific) be enforced by the political 
branches themselves. Vermeule suggests that the legislature 
can be trusted just as well as judges to enforce the Constitu-
tion, and he notes that “even on the crudest model of legislators 
as reelection maximizers, legislators will enforce constitutional 
rules if that is what constituents demand.”246 Thus, Vermeule 
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envisions that political pressures will play a role in constitu-
tional enforcement. There are, however, vital institutional rea-
sons to question whether such a system of enforcement can 
properly give meaning to constitutional guarantees. 
Under Vermeule’s proposal, a person or group desiring en-
forcement of a less-than-perfectly-clear constitutional provi-
sion, such as the Free Speech Clause, could not seek judicial 
review. The only available enforcement mechanism would be 
political agitation, which could take place either in the electoral 
or legislative arena. Both of these, however, lack institutional 
features that are critical to making the Free Speech Clause a 
meaningful guarantee of rights. 
First, consider the possibility of trying to correct an alleged 
violation of Free Speech rights through the electoral process. 
Such a program would face enormous practical problems. The 
violation might be a minor one that would not likely gain much 
traction in any electoral campaign. Even if it were more signifi-
cant, the costs of engaging the political process would surely 
outweigh the cost of bringing a lawsuit by a considerable mul-
tiple.247 Inasmuch as Vermeule’s theory is driven largely by 
cost considerations, this point seems highly significant. 
Beyond these practical points, however, there are crucial 
theoretical and institutional differences between the electoral 
process and the judicial process. First, the judicial process is fo-
cused: parties come to court with a specific claim of right and 
the court can issue a ruling on that precise claim. Elections, by 
contrast, are the very opposite. Even if a constitutional issue 
played some role in an election (say, because a political group 
was attempting to defeat political candidates who supported 
what the group viewed as unconstitutional legislation), the con-
stitutional issue would be only one of dozens of issues that 
come into play in any election, and the other issues could easily 
drown out the importance of the constitutional claim. Elections 
are not referendums; they do not provide a focused mechanism 
through which voters can express their preferences on constitu-
tional issues.248 
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Moreover, even if voters managed to use an election to de-
feat politicians who supported allegedly unconstitutional legis-
lation, the result would still fail to provide effective enforce-
ment of constitutional guarantees because it would be 
impossible to say that the election had established any consti-
tutional rule. Elections have the institutional feature that they 
are inscrutable. They yield only a result, not a statement of 
reasons. One could sense that constitutional issues played a 
role in a politician’s defeat, but one could never really be sure; 
perhaps the politician would have lost anyway. The judicial 
process, by contrast, provides a statement of reasons for its de-
cisions.249 These statements of reasons can truly establish con-
stitutional principles, because they expressly articulate legal 
norms that show why one party wins and the other loses. Elec-
tions do not articulate norms. 
Moreover, the electoral system does not operate within a 
system of precedent. Because, as just noted, elections yield only 
a result and provide no statement of reasons, it would be im-
possible for voters to follow the precedent set by elections, even 
if they wanted to. Moreover, even if voters somehow understood 
an election result to have turned on a constitutional issue, no 
rule in the electoral system requires the voters to vote the same 
way at the next election. The judicial process, by contrast, op-
erates within a system of precedent that tends to ensure that 
constitutional norms remain established. 
Finally, the electoral process is majoritarian. Politicians 
who take action that might violate constitutional guarantees 
presumably do so because they believe they will gain political 
advantage.250 If the politicians correctly detect the popular 
mood, they may prevail despite the unconstitutionality of their 
actions. The electoral process could hardly serve as a good in-
stitutional mechanism for putting certain matters beyond ma-
joritarian control. In contrast, the judicial process can check 
majoritarian tendencies because of the political insulation of 
judges. 
Thus, there are several institutional reasons why the elec-
toral process seems a poor vehicle for enforcement of constitu-
tional guarantees. Vermeule also suggests the possibility of en-
forcement of constitutional guarantees through the political 
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process more generally, rather than simply at the ballot box.251 
Even legislators who do not fear electoral defeat over a particu-
lar constitutional issue might desire to placate a group that 
feels strongly about it. Therefore, the legislative process might 
provide a vehicle for enforcement of constitutional guarantees 
even if the electoral process itself does not. 
Despite this possibility, there are important institutional 
reasons to suspect that the legislative process will be inferior to 
the judicial process in this regard. The legislative process might 
avoid some difficulties with the electoral process: it has at least 
some potential to be more focused and less inscrutable than the 
electoral process. A particular constitutional issue could be de-
cided on an up-or-down legislative vote. But this does not al-
ways happen; constitutionally doubtful provisions might appear 
in the same bill as other, vital matters, and the vagaries of the 
legislative process might never allow a vote on the doubtful 
provisions independent of the bill as a whole. The legislature 
might vote for the bill as a whole because its overall virtues 
outweigh any doubts about the constitutionality of a particular 
provisions. Thus, the legislative process, like the electoral 
process, might lack the focused nature of the judicial process. 
Also, the legislative process is majoritarian in nature and 
seems unlikely to be a good mechanism to enforce restraints on 
majoritarianism. 
In addition, the legislative process does not operate within 
a system of precedent. One Congress can always undo what a 
previous Congress has enacted. Vermeule makes the interest-
ing argument that the legislative process may have a stronger 
tendency to respect precedent than the judicial process because 
the legislature has formal requirements for changing the law 
from the status quo (it must pass a new bill through the bicam-
eral process), whereas the judiciary has no formal restraint on 
overruling its past decisions.252 Still, the judicial process oper-
ates within an ethic whereby precedent ought to be respected 
over time, whereas it is regarded as altogether appropriate for 
a legislature to repeal previous statutes, or to enact statutes 
that a prior legislature declined to enact, for no other reason 
than that its membership has changed. Like the electoral 
process, therefore, the legislative process seems a poor struc-
ture for the establishment and enforcement of constitutional 
guarantees. Without a system of precedent, constitutional 
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guarantees can never really be established. Even if a potential-
ly unconstitutional bill were legislatively defeated on constitu-
tional grounds, the defeat would not establish a constitutional 
norm. Proponents of the bill could just keep reintroducing it 
until it passed. 
Finally, and most importantly, unlike elections and judicial 
process, the legislative process is not available to citizens as a 
matter of right. Disgruntled citizens can complain to the legis-
lature that a statute violates their constitutional rights, but 
they cannot compel the legislature to vote on their complaint. 
The legislature may simply ignore the issue indefinitely. In 
contrast, elections are mandatory: they occur at constitutional-
ly specified intervals. Similarly, the judicial process provides a 
mandatory mechanism for resolution of claims of constitutional 
right.253 Courts must respond to constitutional claims, perhaps 
rejecting them on their merits, of course, but not ignoring them 
altogether. 
Therefore, in considering the institutional features of 
courts in relation to their suitability to conduct judicial review, 
it is not just the political insulation of courts that matters. That 
is an important feature, to be sure. As noted in the previous 
Section, the separation of the judicial power from the political 
branches enables the courts to check the political branch’s nat-
ural self-aggrandizing tendency. But it is the whole range of 
the judiciary’s institutional features that contributes to the sui-
tability of courts as implementers of constitutional guarantees. 
The fact that the judicial power is focused, that it is mandatory, 
that it provides reasons for its decisions, and that it operates 
within a system of precedent, all contribute to having a system 
in which constitutional guarantees are meaningful. The elec-
toral and legislative processes do not offer these features.254 
Thus, again, while one must concede that the power of 
judicial review can be used for ill as well as for good, there are 
institutional reasons to believe that it offers net benefits. Once 
the likely benefits of the process are demonstrated, Vermeule’s 
argument fails. One can no longer accept his argument that in-
asmuch as the expected net benefits are zero, we might as well 
eliminate judicial review and save its costs. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Professor Vermeule’s book offers a useful challenge to con-
ventional thinking about the judicial role in interpreting sta-
tutes and the Constitution. Formal, theoretical arguments have 
dominated the debate, with many scholars focusing on ques-
tions such as whether the Constitution requires courts to follow 
certain rules of interpretation, and whether the ultimate guide 
to statutory meaning is found in statutory text or in legislative 
intent. Vermeule offers a shift in thinking and makes the intri-
guing suggestion that those battling over interpretive theories 
might, in the end, agree on interpretive methods, thus render-
ing the theoretical debates irrelevant, if only they were to focus 
on how the institutional failings of courts interfere with ideal 
implementation of interpretive theories. Vermeule rightly chal-
lenges those who call upon courts to employ allegedly sophisti-
cated interpretive techniques and to depart from statutory text 
in some cases to offer reasons demonstrating that these me-
thods will not only produce superior results in isolated cases, 
but will, on the whole, do more good than harm. 
However, this Article has suggested that Vermeule has not 
considered a sufficient range of institutional features of the 
courts. The courts’ political insulation, to which he adverts, is 
certainly an important feature, but it is by no means the only 
important feature that has implications for the courts’ role in 
interpretation. The timing of judicial action, and particularly 
the fact that courts interpret statutes at the moment of imple-
mentation, implies that they have an institutional advantage in 
detecting cases in which departure from statutory text is ap-
propriate. The courts’ separation from the primary role in for-
mulating and implementing policy also puts them in a good po-
sition to counteract the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the 
political branches. And a range of institutional features of the 
judicial process—that it is mandatory, that it is focused, that it 
provides reasons for its decisions, and that it operates within a 
system of precedent—make it a superior choice for the en-
forcement of constitutional norms. These institutional features 
of courts suggest that there are likely benefits to allowing 
courts to use interpretive methods that go beyond Vermeule’s 
ultrastrict textualism. These benefits defeat his suggestion that 
courts should abandon all such methods on the grounds that 
they have zero benefits, but positive costs. 
